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# OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol

## draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-management-00

### Abstract

This specification defines methods for management of dynamic OAuth 2.0 client registrations.

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## 1. Introduction

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In order for an OAuth 2.0 client to utilize an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, the client needs specific information to interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 Client ID to use at that server. The **OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Core Protocol** [OAuth.Registration] specification describes how an OAuth 2.0 client can be dynamically registered with an authorization server to obtain this information and how metadata about the client can be registered with the server.

This specification extends the core registration specification by defining a set of methods for management of dynamic OAuth 2.0 client registrations beyond those defined in the core registration specification.

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### 1.1. Notational Conventions

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The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in **[RFC2119]**.

Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values are case sensitive.

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### 1.2. Terminology

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This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token", "Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server", "Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint" defined by **OAuth 2.0** [RFC6749] and the terms defined by the **OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration Core Protocol** [OAuth.Registration].

This specification defines the following terms:

Client Configuration Endpoint

OAuth 2.0 endpoint through which registration information for a registered client can be managed. This URL for this endpoint is returned by the authorization server in the client information response.

Registration Access Token

OAuth 2.0 bearer token issued by the authorization server through the client registration endpoint that is used to authenticate the caller when accessing the client's registration information at the client configuration endpoint. This access token is associated with a particular registered client.

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This extends the flow in the **OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Core Protocol** [OAuth.Registration] specification as follows:




Figure 1: Abstract Extended Dynamic Client Registration Flow

The abstract OAuth 2.0 client dynamic registration flow illustrated in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the client or developer and the endpoints defined in this specification and its parent. This figure does not demonstrate error conditions. This flow includes the following steps:

- (A) Optionally, the client or developer is issued an initial access token for use with the client registration endpoint. The method by which the initial access token is issued to the client or developer is out of scope for this specification.
- (B) Optionally, the client or developer is issued a software statement for use with the client registration endpoint. The method by which the software statement is issued to the client or developer is out of scope for this specification.
- (C) The client or developer calls the client registration endpoint with its desired registration metadata, optionally including the initial access token from (A) if one is required by the authorization server.
- (D) The authorization server registers the client and returns the client's registered metadata, a client identifier that is unique at the server, a set of client credentials such as a client secret if applicable for this client, a URI pointing to the client configuration endpoint, and a registration access token to be used when calling the client configuration endpoint.
- (E) The client or developer optionally calls the client configuration endpoint with a read or update request using the registration access token issued in (D). An update request contains all of the client's registered metadata.
- (F) The authorization server responds with the client's current configuration, potentially including a new registration access token and a new set of client credentials such as a client secret if applicable for this client. If a new registration access token is issued, it replaces the token issued in (D) for all subsequent calls to the client configuration endpoint.
- (G) The client or developer optionally calls the client configuration endpoint with a delete request using the registration access token issued in (D).

(H)

The authorization server deprovisions the client and responds with a confirmation that the deletion has taken place.

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## 1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials

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Throughout the course of the dynamic registration protocol, there are three different classes of credentials in play, each with different properties and targets.

- The initial access token is optionally used by the client or developer at the registration endpoint. This is an OAuth 2.0 token that is used to authorize the initial client registration request. The content, structure, generation, and validation of this token are out of scope for this specification. The authorization server can use this token to verify that the presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients. This token may be shared between multiple instances of a client to allow them to each register separately, thereby letting the authorization server use this token to tie multiple instances of registered clients (each with their own distinct client identifier) back to the party to whom the initial access token was issued, usually an application developer. This token should be used only at the client registration endpoint.
- The registration access token is used by the client or developer at the client configuration endpoint and represents the holder's authorization to manage the registration of a client. This is an OAuth 2.0 bearer token that is issued from the client registration endpoint in response to a client registration request and is returned in a client information response. The registration access token is uniquely bound to the client identifier and is required to be presented with all calls to the client configuration endpoint. The registration access token should be protected and should not be shared between instances of a client (otherwise, one instance could change or delete registration values for all instances of the client). The registration access token can be rotated through the use of the client update method on the client configuration endpoint. The registration access token should be used only at the client configuration endpoint.
- The client credentials (such as `client_secret`) are optional depending on the type of client and are used to retrieve OAuth tokens. Client credentials are most often bound to particular instances of a client and should not be shared between instances. Note that since not all types of clients have client credentials, they cannot be used to manage client registrations at the client configuration endpoint. The client credentials can be rotated through the use of the client update method on the client configuration endpoint. The client credentials cannot be used for authentication at the client registration endpoint or at the client configuration endpoint.

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### 1.4.1. Credential Rotation

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The Authorization Server MAY rotate the client's registration access token and/or client credentials (such as a `client_secret`) throughout the lifetime of the client. The client can discover that these values have changed by reading the client information response returned from either a read or update request to the client configuration endpoint. The client's current registration access token and client credentials (if applicable) MUST be included in this response.

The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response to an update request to the client configuration endpoint, at which point the new registration access token is returned to the client and the old registration access token SHOULD be discarded by both parties. If the registration access token were to expire or be rotated outside of such requests, the client or developer might be locked out of managing the client's configuration.

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## 2. Client Configuration Endpoint

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The client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource that is provisioned by the server to facilitate viewing, updating, and deleting a client's registered information. The location of this endpoint is communicated to the client through the `registration_client_uri` member of the Client Information Response, as specified in **Section 3.1**. The client MUST use its registration access token in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token **[RFC6750]**.

Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of different **HTTP methods** [RFC2616]. If an authorization server does not support a particular method on the client configuration endpoint, it MUST respond with the appropriate error code.

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## 2.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL

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The authorization server MUST provide the client with the fully qualified URL in the `registration_client_uri` element of the Client Information Response, as specified in **Section 3.1**. The authorization server MUST NOT expect the client to construct or discover this URL on its own. The client MUST use the URL as given by the server and MUST NOT construct this URL from component pieces.

Depending on deployment characteristics, the client configuration endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed URL string which combines the client registration endpoint's URL and the issued `client_id` for this client, with the latter as either a path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a client with the client identifier `s6BhdRkqt3` could be given a client configuration endpoint URL of `https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3` (path parameter) or of `https://server.example.com/register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3` (query parameter). In both of these cases, the client simply uses the URL as given by the authorization server.

These common patterns can help the server to more easily determine the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched against the client to which the registration access token was issued. If desired, the server MAY simply return the client registration endpoint URL as the client configuration endpoint URL and change behavior based on the authentication context provided by the registration access token.

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## 2.2. Client Read Request

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To read the current configuration of the client on the authorization server, the client makes an HTTP GET request to the client configuration endpoint, authenticating with its registration access token. This operation SHOULD be idempotent -- not causing changes to the client configuration.

Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for display purposes only):

```
GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
```

Upon successful read of the information for a currently active client, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 200 OK with content type of `application/json` and a payload, as described in **Section 3.1**. Some values in the response, including the `client_secret` and `registration_access_token`, MAY be different from those in the initial registration response. However, since read operations are intended to be idempotent, the read request itself SHOULD NOT cause changes to the client's registered metadata values. If the authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its previous client secret and/or registration access token. The value of the `client_id` MUST NOT change from the initial registration response.

If the registration access token used to make this request is not valid, the server **MUST** respond with an error as described in **OAuth Bearer Token Usage** [RFC6750].

If the client does not exist on this server, the server **MUST** respond with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to make this request **SHOULD** be immediately revoked.

If the client does not have permission to read its record, the server **MUST** return an HTTP 403 Forbidden.

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## 2.3. Client Update Request

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This operation updates a previously-registered client with new metadata at the authorization server. This request is authenticated by the registration access token issued to the client.

The client sends an HTTP PUT to the client configuration endpoint with a content type of `application/json`. The HTTP entity payload is a **JSON** [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all parameters as top-level members of that JSON object.

This request **MUST** include all client metadata fields as returned to the client from a previous registration, read, or update operation. The client **MUST NOT** include the `registration_access_token`, `registration_client_uri`, `client_secret_expires_at`, or `client_id_issued_at` fields described in **Section 3.1**.

Valid values of client metadata fields in this request **MUST** replace, not augment, the values previously associated with this client. Omitted fields **MUST** be treated as null or empty values by the server.

The client **MUST** include its `client_id` field in the request, and it **MUST** be the same as its currently-issued client identifier. If the client includes the `client_secret` field in the request, the value of this field **MUST** match the currently-issued client secret for that client. The client **MUST NOT** be allowed to overwrite its existing client secret with its own chosen value.

For all metadata fields, the authorization server **MAY** replace any invalid values with suitable default values, and it **MUST** return any such fields to the client in the response.

For example, a client could send the following request to the client registration endpoint to update the client registration in the above example with new information:

Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for display purposes only):

```
PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483

{
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
  "redirect_uris": [
    "https://client.example.org/callback",
    "https://client.example.org/alt"],
  "scope": "read write dolphin",
  "grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
  "token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
  "jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
  "client_name": "My New Example",
  "client_name#fr": "Mon Nouvel Exemple",
  "logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/newlogo.png",
  "logo_uri#fr": "https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png"
}
```

This example uses client metadata values defined both in **[OAuth.Registration]** and

## [OAuth.Registration.Metadata].

Upon successful update, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 200 OK Message with content type `application/json` and a payload, as described in **Section 3.1**. Some values in the response, including the `client_secret` and `registration_access_token`, MAY be different from those in the initial registration response. If the authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its previous client secret and/or registration access token. The value of the `client_id` MUST NOT change from the initial registration response.

If the registration access token used to make this request is not valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in **OAuth Bearer Token Usage** [RFC6750].

If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, and the registration access token used to make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.

If the client is not allowed to update its records, the server MUST respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.

If the client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the authorization server does not set a default value, the authorization server responds with an error as described in **[OAuth.Registration]**.

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## 2.4. Client Delete Request

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To deprovision itself on the authorization server, the client makes an HTTP DELETE request to the client configuration endpoint. This request is authenticated by the registration access token issued to the client.

Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for display purposes only):

```
DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
```

A successful delete action will invalidate the `client_id`, `client_secret`, and `registration_access_token` for this client, thereby preventing the `client_id` from being used at either the authorization endpoint or token endpoint of the authorization server. The authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing authorization grants and currently-active tokens associated with this client.

If a client has been successfully deprovisioned, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 204 No Content message.

If the server does not support the delete method, the server MUST respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported.

If the registration access token used to make this request is not valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in **OAuth Bearer Token Usage** [RFC6750].

If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.

If the client is not allowed to delete itself, the server MUST respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.

Following is a non-normative example response:

```
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
```

### 3. Responses

In response to certain requests from the client to either the client registration endpoint or the client configuration endpoint as described in this specification, the authorization server sends the following response bodies.

#### 3.1. Client Information Response

This specification extends the client information response defined in OAuth 2.0 Core Client Dynamic Registration. The response contains the client identifier as well as the client secret, if the client is a confidential client. The response also contains the fully qualified URL of the client configuration endpoint for this specific client that the client may use to obtain and update information about itself. The response also contains a registration access token that is to be used by the client to perform subsequent operations at the client configuration endpoint.

- `client_id`  
REQUIRED. The unique client identifier, MUST NOT be currently valid for any other registered client.
- `client_secret`  
OPTIONAL. The client secret. If issued, this MUST be unique for each `client_id`. This value is used by confidential clients to authenticate to the token endpoint as described in **OAuth 2.0** [RFC6749] Section 2.3.1.
- `client_id_issued_at`  
OPTIONAL. Time at which the Client Identifier was issued. The time is represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
- `client_secret_expires_at`  
REQUIRED if `client_secret` is issued. Time at which the `client_secret` will expire or 0 if it will not expire. The time is represented as the number of seconds from 1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
- `registration_access_token`  
REQUIRED. Access token that is used at the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations upon the client registration.
- `registration_client_uri`  
REQUIRED. The fully qualified URL of the client configuration endpoint for this client. The client MUST use this URL as given when communicating with the client configuration endpoint.

Additionally, the Authorization Server MUST return all registered metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the authorization server itself. The authorization server MAY reject or replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted during the registration or update requests and substitute them with suitable values.

The response is an `application/json` document with all parameters as top-level members of a **JSON object** [RFC4627].

Following is a non-normative example response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache

{
  "registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
  "registration_client_uri":
    "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3",
  "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
  "client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
  "client_id_issued_at": 2893256800,
```



```
"client_secret_expires_at":2893276800,
"client_name":"My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
  "\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"redirect_uris":[
  "https://client.example.org/callback",
  "https://client.example.org/callback2"],
"scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
```

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## 4. IANA Considerations

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This specification makes no requests of IANA.

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## 5. Security Considerations

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While the client secret can expire, the registration access token should not expire while a client is still actively registered. If this token were to expire, a developer or client could be left in a situation where they have no means of retrieving or updating the client's registration information. Were that the case, a new registration would be required, thereby generating a new client identifier. However, to limit the exposure surface of the registration access token, the registration access token MAY be rotated when the developer or client does an update operation on the client's client configuration endpoint. As the registration access tokens are relatively long-term credentials, and since the registration access token is a Bearer token and acts as the sole authentication for use at the client configuration endpoint, it MUST be protected by the developer or client as described in **OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage** [RFC6750].

Since the client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent the registration access token from being disclosed through repeated access attempts.

If a client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding registration access token for that client MUST be invalidated at the same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein a client could make requests to the client configuration endpoint where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail because the client is no longer valid. To prevent accidental disclosure from such an erroneous situation, the authorization server MUST treat all such requests as if the registration access token was invalid (by returning an HTTP 401 Unauthorized error, as described).

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## 6. References

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### 6.1. Normative References

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- [OAuth.Registration] **Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., and M. Machulak**, "**OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Core Protocol**," draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg (work in progress), January 2014 ([HTML](#)).
- [RFC2119] **Bradner, S.**, "**Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels**," BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997 ([TXT](#), [HTML](#), [XML](#)).
- [RFC2616] **Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee**, "**Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1**," RFC 2616, June 1999 ([TXT](#), [PS](#), [PDF](#), [HTML](#), [XML](#)).
- [RFC4627] Crockford, D., "**The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)**," RFC 4627, July 2006 ([TXT](#)).
- [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "**The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework**," RFC 6749, October 2012 ([TXT](#)).

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## 6.2. Informative References

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[[OAuth.Registration.Metadata](#)] [Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J.](#), and [M. Machulak](#), "[OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Metadata](#)," draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-metadata (work in progress), January 2014 ([HTML](#)).

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## Appendix A. Acknowledgments

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## Appendix B. Open Issues

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- Should this specification become a working group document so that the functionality defined in this document that was previously defined in draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-14 is retained in working group drafts?

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## Appendix C. Document History

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[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]

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- Partitioned the Dynamic Client Registration specification into core, metadata, and management specifications. This built on work first published as draft-richer-oauth-dyn-reg-core-00 and draft-richer-oauth-dyn-reg-management-00.
- Clarified that read operations are intended to be idempotent.
- Rewrote the introduction.

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