WEBSEC D. Ross
Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Informational T. Gondrom
Expires: January 30, 2014 Thames Stanley
July 29, 2013
HTTP Header Field X-Frame-Options
draft-ietf-websec-x-frame-options-07
Abstract
To improve the protection of web applications against Clickjacking,
this specification describes the X-Frame-Options HTTP response header
field that declares a policy communicated from the server to the
client browser on whether the browser may display the transmitted
content in frames that are part of other web pages. This
informational document serves to document the existing use and
specification of this X-Frame-Options HTTP response header field.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 30, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. X-Frame-Options Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2.1. Examples of X-Frame-Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Design Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3.1. Enable HTML content from other domains . . . . . . . 5
2.3.2. Browser Behaviour and Processing . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2.1. Violation of X-Frame-Options . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.2.2. Variation in current browser behaviour . . . . . 6
2.3.2.3. Usage design pattern and example scenario for the
ALLOW-FROM parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Privacy Considreations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix A. Browsers that support X-Frame-Options . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Description of a Clickjacking attack . . . . . . . . 10
B.1. Shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.2. Online Shop Confirm Purchase Page . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.3. Flash Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
In 2009 and 2010 many browser vendors ([Microsoft-X-Frame-Options],
[CLICK-DEFENSE-BLOG], [Mozilla-X-Frame-Options]) introduced the use
of a non-standard HTTP [RFC2616] header field "X-Frame-Options" to
protect against Clickjacking [Clickjacking]. HTML-based web
applications can embed or "frame" other web pages. Clickjacking is a
type of attack that occurs when an attacker uses multiple transparent
or opaque layers in the user interface to trick a user into clicking
on a button or link on another page from server B when they were
intending to click on the same place of the overlaying page from
server A. Thus, the attacker is "hijacking" clicks meant for their
page A and routing them to another page B. The attacker is tricking
the user (who sees the overlaying user interface content from page A)
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into clicking specific locations on the underlying page from server
B, triggering some actions on server B and potentially using an
existing session context in that step. This is an attack on both the
user and on server B. And server A may or may not be the attacker.
This specification provides informational documentation about the
current use and definition of the X-Frame-Options HTTP header field.
Given that the "X-" construction is deprecated [RFC6648], the X
-Frame-Options header field will in the future be replaced by the
Frame-Options directive in the Content Security Policy Version 1.1
[CSP-1-1].
Existing anti-ClickJacking measures, e.g. Frame-breaking Javascript,
have weaknesses so that their protection can be circumvented as a
study [FRAME-BUSTING] demonstrated.
Short of configuring the browser to disable frames and script
entirely, which massively impairs browser utility, browser users are
vulnerable to this type of attack.
"X-Frame-Options" allows a secure web page from host B to declare
that its content (for example a button, links, text, etc.) must not
be displayed in a frame ( or