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IODEF-extension to support structured cybersecurity information  
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## Abstract

This document extends the Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) defined in RFC 5070 [RFC5070] to exchange enriched cybersecurity information among cybersecurity entities and facilitate their operations. It provides the capability of embedding structured information, such as identifier- and XML-based information.

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## Table of Contents

1.	Introduction . . . . .	3
2.	Terminology . . . . .	3
3.	Applicability . . . . .	3
4.	Extension Definition . . . . .	4
4.1.	IANA Table for Structured Cybersecurity Information . . . . .	4
4.2.	Extended Data Types . . . . .	5
4.2.1.	XMLDATA . . . . .	5
4.3.	Extended Classes . . . . .	5
4.3.1.	AttackPattern . . . . .	6
4.3.2.	Platform . . . . .	8
4.3.3.	Vulnerability . . . . .	9
4.3.4.	Scoring . . . . .	11
4.3.5.	Weakness . . . . .	12
4.3.6.	EventReport . . . . .	13
4.3.7.	Verification . . . . .	15
4.3.8.	Remediation . . . . .	16
5.	Mandatory to Implement features . . . . .	17
6.	Security Considerations . . . . .	18
6.1.	Transport-Specific Concerns . . . . .	18
7.	IANA Considerations . . . . .	18
8.	Acknowledgment . . . . .	20
9.	Appendix I: XML Schema Definition for Extension . . . . .	20
10.	Appendix II: Candidate Specifications for the IANA Table . . . . .	25
11.	Appendix III: An XML Example . . . . .	28
12.	References . . . . .	30
12.1.	Normative References . . . . .	30
12.2.	Informative References . . . . .	31
	Authors' Addresses . . . . .	33

## 1. Introduction

The number of cyber attacks is growing day by day, and incident information needs to be reported, exchanged, and shared among organizations in order to cope with the situation. IODEF is one of the tools enabling such exchange, and is already in use.

To efficiently run cybersecurity operations, these exchanged information needs to be machine-readable. IODEF provides a structured means to describe the information, but it needs to embed various non-structured such information in order to convey detailed information. Further structure within IODEF increases IODEF documents' machine-readability and thus facilitates streamlining cybersecurity operations.

On the other hand, there exist various other activities facilitating detailed and structured description of cybersecurity information, as listed in Section 10. Since such structured description facilitates cybersecurity operations, it would be beneficial to embed and convey these information inside IODEF document.

To enable that, this document extends the IODEF to embed and convey various structured cybersecurity information, with which cybersecurity operations can be facilitated. Since IODEF defines a flexible and extensible format and supports a granular level of specificity, this document defines an extension to IODEF instead of defining a new report format. For clarity, and to eliminate duplication, only the additional structures necessary for describing the exchange of such structured information are provided.

## 2. Terminology

The terminology used in this document follows the one defined in RFC 5070 [RFC5070].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

## 3. Applicability

To maintain cybersecurity, organization needs to exchange cybersecurity information, which includes the following information: attack pattern, platform information, vulnerability and weakness, countermeasure instruction, computer event log, and the severity.

IODEF provides a scheme to describe and exchange such information among interested parties. However, it does not define the detailed format to describe such information.

On the other hand, there already exist structured and detailed formats for describing those information and facilitating such exchange. Major of them are listed in Section 10. By embedding them into the IODEF document, the document can convey more detailed contents to the receivers, and the document can be easily reused.

These structured cybersecurity information facilitates cybersecurity operation at the receiver side. Since the information is machine-readable, the data can be processed by computers. That expedites the automation of cybersecurity operations

For instance, an organization wishing to report a security incident wants to describe what vulnerability was exploited. Then the sender can simply use IODEF, where an XML [XML1.0]-based attack pattern record that follows the syntax and vocabulary defined by an industry specification is embedded instead of describing everything in free format text. Receiver can identify the needed details of the attack pattern by looking up some of the XML tags defined by the specification. Receiver can accumulate the attack pattern record in its database and could distribute it to the interested parties if needed, without needing human interventions.

Another example is that, when an administrator wishes to check the configuration of host computers in his organization, he may send a query to host computers, which may automatically generate XML-based software configuration information upon receiving the query by running a software and may embed that to an IODEF document, which is then sent back to the administrator.

#### 4. Extension Definition

This draft extends IODEF to embed structured cybersecurity information by introducing new classes, with which these information can be embedded inside IODEF document as element contents of AdditionalData and RecordItem classes.

##### 4.1. IANA Table for Structured Cybersecurity Information

This extension embeds structured cybersecurity information defined by the other specifications. The list of supported specifications is managed by IANA, and this draft defines the needed field for the list's entry.

Each entry has namespace [XMLNames], specification name, version, reference URI, and applicable classes for each specification. Arbitrary URIs that may help readers to understand the specification could be embedded inside the Reference URI field, but it is recommended that standard/informational URI describing the specification is prepared and is embedded here.

The table is to be managed by IANA using the Expert Review [RFC5226] and Specification Required [RFC5226] allocation policies as further specified in Section 7.

The SpecID attributes of extended classes (Section 4.3) must allow the values of the specifications' namespace fields, but otherwise, implementations are not required to support all the above specifications. Implementations may choose which specifications to support, though identifier and xml-data following CVE 1.0 [CVE] need to be minimally supported, as described in Section 5. In case an implementation received a data it does not support, it may expand its functionality by looking up the IANA table or notify the sender of its inability to parse the data by using any means defined outside the scope of this specification.

## 4.2. Extended Data Types

This extension inherits all of the data types defined in the IODEF model. One data type is added: XMLDATA.

### 4.2.1. XMLDATA

An embedded XML data is represented by the XMLDATA data type. This type is defined as the extension to the iodef:ExtensionType [RFC5070], whose dtype attribute is set to "xml."

## 4.3. Extended Classes

The IODEF Incident element [RFC5070] is summarized below. It is expressed in Unified Modeling Language (UML) syntax as used in the IODEF specification. The UML representation is for illustrative purposes only; elements are specified in XML as defined in Appendix A.

+-----+   Incident   +-----+	
ENUM purpose	<>-----[IncidentID]
STRING ext-purpose	<>--{0..1}-[AlternativeID]
ENUM lang	<>--{0..1}-[RelatedActivity]
ENUM restriction	<>--{0..1}-[DetectTime]
	<>--{0..1}-[StartTime]
	<>--{0..1}-[EndTime]
	<>-----[ReportTime]
	<>--{0..*}-[Description]
	<>--{1..*}-[Assessment]
	<>--{0..*}-[Method]
	<>--[AdditionalData]
	<>--[AttackPattern]
	<>--[Vulnerability]
	<>--[Weakness]
	<>--{1..*}-[Contact]
	<>--{0..*}-[EventData]
	<>--[Flow]
	<>--[System]
	<>--[AdditionalData]
	<>--[Platform]
	<>--[Expectation]
	<>--[Record]
	<>--[RecordData]
	<>--[RecordItem]
	<>--[EventReport]
	<>--{0..1}-[History]
	<>--{0..*}-[AdditionalData]
	<>--[Verification]
	<>--[Remediation]

Figure 1: Incident class

This extension defines the following seven elements.

#### 4.3.1. AttackPattern

An AttackPattern consists of an extension to the Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The extension describes attack patterns of incidents or events.

It is recommended that Method class SHOULD contain one or more of the extension elements whenever available.

An AttackPattern class is structured as follows.

```

+-----+
| AttackPattern |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING AttackPatternID | <>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
+-----+

```

Figure 2: AttackPattern class

This class has the following attributes.

**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be "private."

**AttackPatternID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of an attack pattern to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.

The AttackPattern class is composed of the following aggregate classes.

**RawData:** Zero or more. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

Reference: Zero or more of `iodef:Reference` [RFC5070]. This element allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured information instead of directly embedding it into a `RawData` element.

Platform: Zero or more. An identifier of software platform involved in the specific attack pattern, which is elaborated in Section 4.3.2.

#### 4.3.2. Platform

A Platform identifies a software platform. It is recommended that `AttackPattern`, `Vulnerability`, `Weakness`, and `System` classes contain this elements whenever available.

A Platform element is structured as follows.

```
+-----+
| Platform |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING PlatformID |
+-----+
```

Figure 3: Platform class

This class has the following attributes.

**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying `RawData` based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, `ext-SpecID` element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of `SpecID` element must be "private."



PlatformID: OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a platform to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.

This class is composed of the following aggregate classes.

RawData: Zero or more. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

Reference: Zero or more of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. This element allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured information instead of directly embedding it into a RawData element.

#### 4.3.3. Vulnerability

A Vulnerability consists of an extension to the Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The extension describes the (candidate) vulnerabilities of incidents or events.

It is recommended that Method class SHOULD contain one or more of the extension elements whenever available.

A Vulnerability element is structured as follows.

```
+-----+
| Vulnerability          |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID            | <>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID     | <>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING VulnerabilityID | <>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
|                       | <>--(0..*)-[ Scoring ]
+-----+
```

Figure 4: Vulnerability class

This class has the following attributes.

**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be "private."

**VulnerabilityID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a vulnerability to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.

This class is composed of the following aggregate classes.

**RawData:** Zero or one. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

**Reference:** Zero or one of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. This element allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured information instead of directly embedding it into a RawData element.

**Platform:** Zero or more. An identifier of software platform affected by the vulnerability, which is elaborated in Section 4.3.2.

**Scoring:** Zero or more. An indicator of the severity of the vulnerability, such as CVSS and CCSS scores, which is elaborated in Section 4.3.4. Some of the structured information may include scores within it. In this case, the Scoring element SHOULD NOT be used since the RawData element contains the scores. If a reader/receiver detects scores in both RawData and Scoring elements and their inconsistency, it SHOULD prefer the scores derived from the RawData element, and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.

## 4.3.4. Scoring

A Scoring class describes the scores of the severity in terms of security. It is recommended that Vulnerability and Weakness classes contain the elements whenever available.

A Scoring class is structured as follows.

```
+-----+
| Scoring |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID | <>-----[ ScoreSet ]
| STRING ext-SpecID |
+-----+
```

Figure 5: Scoring class

This class has two attributes.

**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be "private."

This class is composed of an aggregate class.

**ScoreSet:** One. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. This element includes a set of score information. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and version identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of the

Score; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD prefer the specification name and version derived from the content, and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.

#### 4.3.5. Weakness

A Weakness consists of an extension to the Incident.Method.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The extension describes the weakness types of incidents or events.

It is recommended that Method class SHOULD contain one or more of the extension elements whenever available.

A Weakness element is structured as follows.

```
+-----+
| Weakness |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING WeaknessID | <>--(0..*)-[ Platform ]
| | <>--(0..*)-[ Scoring ]
+-----+
```

Figure 6: Weakness class

This class has the following attributes.

**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be "private."

**WeaknessID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a weakness to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier is available/ Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if

this attribute is omitted.

This class is composed of the following aggregate classes.

**RawData:** Zero or more. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

**Reference:** Zero or one of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. This element allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured information instead of directly embedding it into a RawData element.

**Platform:** Zero or more. An identifier of software platform affected by the weakness, which is elaborated in Section 4.3.2.

**Scoring:** Zero or more. An indicator of the severity of the weakness, such as CWSS score, which is elaborated in Section 4.3.4.

#### 4.3.6. EventReport

An EventReport consists of an extension to the Incident.EventData.Record.RecordData.RecordItem element with a dtype of "xml". The extension embeds structured event reports.

It is recommended that RecordItem class SHOULD contain one or more of the extension elements whenever available.

An EventReport element is structured as follows.

```
+-----+
| EventReport |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING EventID |
+-----+
```

Figure 7: EventReport class

This class has the following attributes.

**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be "private."

**EventID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of an event to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.

This class is composed of three aggregate classes.

**RawData:** Zero or one. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

**Reference:** Zero or one of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. This element allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured information instead of directly embedding it into a RawData element.

This class MUST contain at least one of RawData or Reference elements. Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and version identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of the RawData; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD prefer the specification name and version derived from the content, and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.

## 4.3.7. Verification

A Verification consists of an extension to the Incident.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The extension elements describes incident on vefifying incidents.

A Verification class is structured as follows.

```

+-----+
| Verification |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID   | <>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| STRING VerificationID|
+-----+

```

Figure 8: Verification class

This class has the following attributes.

**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be "private."

**VerificationID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of an check item to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.

This class is composed of two aggregate classes.

**RawData:** Zero or one. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

**Reference:** Zero or one of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. This element allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured information instead of directly embedding it into a RawData element.

This class MUST contain at least either of RawData and Reference elements. Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and version identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of the RawData; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD prefer the specification name and version derived from the content, and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.

#### 4.3.8. Remediation

A Remediation consists of an extension to the Incident.AdditionalData element with a dtype of "xml". The extension elements describes incident remediation information including instructions.

It is recommended that Incident class SHOULD contain one or more of this extension elements whenever available.

A Remediation class is structured as follows.

```
+-----+
| Remediation |
+-----+
| ENUM SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ RawData ]
| STRING ext-SpecID | <>--(0..*)-[ Reference ]
| String RemediationID |
+-----+
```

Figure 9: Remediation class

This class has the following attributes.



**SpecID:** REQUIRED. ENUM. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. The value should be chosen from the namespaces [XMLNames] listed in the IANA table (Section 4.1) or "private". The value "private" is prepared for conveying RawData based on a format that is not listed in the table. This is usually used for conveying data formatted according to an organization's private schema. When the value "private" is used, ext-SpecID element MUST be used.

**ext-SpecID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. A specification's identifier that specifies the format of a structured cybersecurity information. When this element is used, the value of SpecID element must be "private."

**RemediationID:** OPTIONAL. STRING. An identifier of a remediation information to be reported. This attribute SHOULD be used whenever such identifier is available. Both RawData and Reference elements MUST NOT be used when this attribute is used, while either of them MUST be used if this attribute is omitted.

This class is composed of two aggregate classes.

**RawData:** Zero or one. XMLDATA. A complete document that is formatted according to the specification and its version identified by the SpecID/ext-SpecID. When this element is used, writers/senders MUST ensure that the namespace specified by SpecID/ext-SpecID and the one used in the RawData element are consistent; if not, the namespace identified by SpecID SHOULD be preferred, and the inconsistency SHOULD be logged so a human can correct the problem.

**Reference:** Zero or one of iodef:Reference [RFC5070]. This element allows an IODEF document to include a link to a structured information instead of directly embedding it into a RawData element.

This class MUST contain at least either of RawData and Reference elements. Writers/senders MUST ensure the specification name and version identified by the SpecID are consistent with the contents of the RawData; if a reader/receiver detects an inconsistency, it SHOULD prefer the specification name and version derived from the content, and SHOULD log the inconsistency so a human can correct the problem.

## 5. Mandatory to Implement features

The implementation of this draft MUST be capable of sending and receiving the XML described in Section 11 without error.

The receiver MUST be capable of validating received XML documents that are embedeed inside that against their schemata. Note that the receiver can look up the namespace in the IANA table to understand what specifications the embedded XML documents follows.

## 6. Security Considerations

This document specifies a format for encoding a particular class of security incidents appropriate for exchange across organizations. As merely a data representation, it does not directly introduce security issues. However, it is guaranteed that parties exchanging instances of this specification will have certain concerns. For this reason, the underlying message format and transport protocol used MUST ensure the appropriate degree of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity for the specific environment.

Organizations that exchange data using this document are URGED to develop operating procedures that document the following areas of concern.

### 6.1. Transport-Specific Concerns

The underlying messaging format and protocol used to exchange instances of the IODEF MUST provide appropriate guarantees of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The use of a standardized security protocol is encouraged. The Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) protocol [RFC6045] and its associated transport binding [RFC6046] provide such security.

The critical security concerns are that these structured information may be falsified or they may become corrupt during transit. In areas where transmission security or secrecy is questionable, the application of a digital signature and/or message encryption on each report will counteract both of these concerns. We expect that each exchanging organization will determine the need, and mechanism, for transport protection.

## 7. IANA Considerations

This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemata[XMLschemaPart1][XMLschemaPart2] conforming to a registry mechanism described in [RFC3688].

Registration request for the IODEF structured cybersecurity information extension namespace:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0

Registrant Contact: Refer here to the authors' addresses section of the document.

XML: None

Registration request for the IODEF structured cybersecurity information extension XML schema:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-sci-1.0

Registrant Contact: Refer here to the authors' addresses section of the document.

XML: Refer here to the XML Schema in the appendix of the document.

This memo creates the following registry for IANA to manage:

Name of the registry: "IODEF Structured Cyber Security Information Specifications"

Namespace details: A registry entry for a Structured Cyber Security Information Specification (SCI specification) consists of:

Namespace: A URI [RFC3986] that is the XML namespace name used by the registered SCI specification.

Specification Name: A string containing the spelled-out name of the SCI specification in human-readable form.

Reference URI: A list of one or more of the URIs [RFC3986] from which the registered specification can be obtained. The registered specification MUST be readily and publicly available from that URI.

Applicable Classes: A list of one or more of the Extended Classes specified in Section 4.3 of this document. The registered SCI specification MUST only be used with the Extended Classes in the registry entry.

Information that must be provided to assign a new value: The above list of information.

Fields to record in the registry: Namespace/Specification Name/Version/Applicable Classes.

Initial registry contents: none

Allocation Policy: Expert Review [RFC5226] and Specification Required [RFC5226].

The Designated Expert is expected to consult with the mile (Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange) working group or its successor if any such WG exists (e.g., via email to the working group's mailing list). The Designated Expert is expected to retrieve the SCI specification from the provided URI in order to check the public availability of the specification and verify the correctness of the URI. An important responsibility of the Designated Expert is to ensure that the registered Applicable Classes are appropriate for the registered SCI specification.

## 8. Acknowledgment

We would like to acknowledge Mr. David Black from EMC, who kindly provided generous support, especially on the IANA registry issues. We also would like to thank Jon Baker from MITRE, Paul Cichonski from NIST, Robert Martin from MITRE, Kathleen Moriarty from EMC, Lagadec Philippe from NATO, Shuhei Yamaguchi from NICT, Anthony Rutkowski from Yaana Technology, Brian Trammel from CERT/NetSA, and David Waltermire from NIST for their sincere discussion and feedback on this document.

## 9. Appendix I: XML Schema Definition for Extension

The XML Schema describing the elements defined in the Extension Definition section is given here. Each of the examples in Section 11 should be verified to validate against this schema by automated tools.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<xsd:schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
  xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
  xmlns:iodef-sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
  elementFormDefault="qualified" attributeFormDefault="unqualified">

<xsd:import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
  schemaLocation="iodef_schema.xsd"/>

<!--
```

```

  schemaLocation="urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:iodef-1.0"/>
-->

<!--=====
== XMLDATA                                                    ==
=====-->

<xsd:complexType name="XMLDATA">
  <xsd:complexContent>
    <xsd:restriction base="iodef:ExtensionType">
      <xsd:sequence>
        <xsd:any namespace="##any" processContents="lax" minOccurs="0"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:attribute name="dtype" type="iodef:dtype-type" use="required" fixed="xml"/>
      <xsd:attribute name="ext-dtype" type="xsd:string" use="optional"/>
      <xsd:attribute name="meaning" type="xsd:string"/>
      <xsd:attribute name="formatid" type="xsd:string"/>
      <xsd:attribute name="restriction" type="iodef:restriction-type"/>
    </xsd:restriction>
  </xsd:complexContent>
</xsd:complexType>

<!--=====
== Scoring Class                                              ==
=====-->

  <xsd:element name="Scoring">
    <xsd:complexType>
      <xsd:sequence>
        <xsd:element name="ScoreSet" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"
          minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
      <xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"
        use="optional"/>
    </xsd:complexType>
  </xsd:element>

<!--=====
== AttackPattern Class                                       ==
=====-->

  <xsd:element name="AttackPattern">
    <xsd:complexType>
      <xsd:sequence>
        <xsd:choice>

```

```

    <xsd:element name="RawData" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    <xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0"
      maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xsd:choice>
  <xsd:element ref="iodef-sci:Platform" minOccurs="0"
    maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
<xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"
  use="optional"/>
<xsd:attribute name="AttackPatternID" type="xsd:string"
  use="optional"/>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

<!--=====
== Vulnerability Class                                     ==
=====-->

<xsd:element name="Vulnerability">
  <xsd:complexType>
    <xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:choice>
        <xsd:element name="RawData" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"
          minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        <xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xsd:choice>
      <xsd:element ref="iodef-sci:Platform" minOccurs="0"
        maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      <xsd:element ref="iodef-sci:Scoring" minOccurs="0"
        maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xsd:sequence>
    <xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="VulnerabilityID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
  </xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

<!--=====
== Weakness Class                                         ==
=====-->

<xsd:element name="Weakness">
  <xsd:complexType>
```

```

<xsd:sequence>
  <xsd:choice>
    <xsd:element name="RawData" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    <xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0"
      maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xsd:choice>
  <xsd:element ref="iodef-sci:Platform" minOccurs="0"
    maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  <xsd:element ref="iodef-sci:Scoring" minOccurs="0"
    maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xsd:sequence>
<xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
<xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"
  use="optional"/>
<xsd:attribute name="WeaknessID" type="xsd:string"
  use="optional"/>
</xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

<!--=====
== Platform Class                                     ==
=====-->

<xsd:element name="Platform">
  <xsd:complexType>
    <xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:choice>
        <xsd:element name="RawData" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"
          minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
        <xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference" minOccurs="0"
          maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
      </xsd:choice>
    </xsd:sequence>
    <xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="PlatformID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
  </xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

<!--=====
== EventReport Class                                   ==
=====-->

<xsd:element name="EventReport">
  <xsd:complexType>

```

```

    <xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:choice>
        <xsd:element name="RawData" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"/>
        <xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference"/>
      </xsd:choice>
    </xsd:sequence>
    <xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="EventID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
  </xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

<!--=====
== Verification Class                                     ==
=====-->

<xsd:element name="Verification">
  <xsd:complexType>
    <xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:choice>
        <xsd:element name="RawData" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"/>
        <xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference"/>
      </xsd:choice>
    </xsd:sequence>
    <xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="VerificationID" type="xsd:string"
      use="optional"/>
  </xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

<!--=====
== Remediation Class                                     ==
=====-->

<xsd:element name="Remediation">
  <xsd:complexType>
    <xsd:sequence>
      <xsd:choice>
        <xsd:element name="RawData" type="iodef-sci:XMLDATA"/>
        <xsd:element ref="iodef:Reference"/>
      </xsd:choice>
    </xsd:sequence>
    <xsd:attribute name="SpecID" type="xsd:string" use="required"/>
    <xsd:attribute name="ext-SpecID" type="xsd:string"

```



```
        use="optional"/>
        <xsd:attribute name="RemediationID" type="xsd:string"
        use="optional"/>
    </xsd:complexType>
</xsd:element>

</xsd:schema>
```

## 10. Appendix II: Candidate Specifications for the IANA Table

This draft defined the structure of the IANA table in Section 4.1. Though the management of the table is up to IANA, this appendix provides candidate entries. Note that OVAL and CVE are registered trademarks, and CAPEC, CCE, CEE, CPE, CWE, CWSS, MAEC, and OCIL are trademarks, of The MITRE Corporation.

### 1. CAPEC 1.6

Namespace: <http://capec.mitre.org/observables>  
Specification Name: Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification  
Version: 1.6  
Reference URI: <http://capec.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: AttackPattern

### 2. CCE 5.0

Namespace: <http://cce.mitre.org>  
Specification Name: Common Configuration Enumeration  
Version: 5.0  
Reference URI: <http://cce.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: Verification

### 3. CCSS 1.0

Namespace: N/A  
Specification Name: Common Configuration Scoring System  
Version: 1.0  
Reference URI: <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html>  
#NIST-IR-7502  
Applicable Classes: Scoring

### 4. CEE 1.0 alpha

Namespace: <http://cee.mitre.org>  
Specification Name: Common Event Expression  
Version: 1.0 alpha  
Reference URI: <http://cee.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: EventReport

## 5. CPE 2.3 Language

Namespace: <http://cpe.mitre.org/language/2.0>  
Specification Name: Common Platform Enumeration Reference  
Version: 2.3  
Reference URI: <http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/cpe/>,  
[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html#NIST-IR-7695)  
#NIST-IR-7695  
Applicable Classes: Platform

## 6. CPE 2.3 Dictionary

Namespace: <http://cpe.mitre.org/dictionary/2.0>  
Specification Name: Common Platform Enumeration Dictionary  
Version: 2.3  
Reference URI: <http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/cpe/>,  
[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html#NIST-IR-7697)  
#NIST-IR-7697  
Applicable Classes: Platform

## 7. CVE 1.0

Namespace: <http://cve.mitre.org/cve/downloads/1.0>  
Specification Name: Common Vulnerability and Exposures  
Version: 1.0  
Reference URI: <http://cve.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: Vulnerability

## 8. CVRF 1.0

Namespace: <http://www.icas.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.0>  
Specification Name: Common Vulnerability Reporting Format  
Version: 1.0  
Reference URI: <http://www.icas.org/cvrf>  
Applicable Classes: Vulnerability

## 9. CVSS 2.0

Namespace: <http://scap.nist.gov/schema/cvss-v2/1.0>  
Specification Name: Common Vulnerability Scoring System  
Version: 2  
Reference URI: <http://www.first.org/cvss>

Applicable Classes: Scoring

#### 10. CWE 5.0

Namespace: N/A  
Specification Name: Common Weakness Enumeration  
Version: 5.1  
Reference URI: <http://cwe.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: Weakness

#### 11. CWSS 0.8

Namespace: N/A  
Specification Name: Common Weakness Scoring System  
Version: 0.8  
Reference URI: <http://cwe.mitre.org/cwss/>  
Applicable Classes: Scoring

#### 12. MAEC 2.0

Namespace: <http://maec.mitre.org/XMLSchema/maec-core-2>  
Specification Name: Malware Attribute Enumeration and Characterization  
Version: 2.0  
Reference URI: <http://maec.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: EventReport, AttackPattern

#### 13. OCIL 2.0

Namespace: <http://scap.nist.gov/schema/ocil/2.0>  
Specification Name: Open Checklist Interactive Language  
Version: 2.0  
Reference URI: <http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/ocil/>,  
[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html  
#NIST-IR-7692](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html#NIST-IR-7692)  
Applicable Classes: Verification

#### 14. OVAL 5.10.1 Definitions

Namespace: <http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-definitions-5>  
Specification Name: Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language  
Version: 5.10.1  
Reference URI: <http://oval.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: Verification

#### 15. OVAL 5.10.1 Results

Namespace: <http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-results-5>  
Specification Name: Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language  
Version: 5.10.1  
Reference URI: <http://oval.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: Verification

#### 16. OVAL 5.10.1 Common

Namespace: <http://oval.mitre.org/XMLSchema/oval-common-5>  
Specification Name: Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language  
Version: 5.10.1  
Reference URI: <http://oval.mitre.org/>  
Applicable Classes: Verification

#### 17. XCCDF 1.2

Namespace: <http://checklists.nist.gov/xccdf/1.2>  
Specification Name: Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format  
Version: 1.2  
Reference URI: <http://scap.nist.gov/specifications/xccdf/>,  
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsNISTIRs.html>  
#NIST-IR-7275-r4  
Applicable Classes: Verification

### 11. Appendix III: An XML Example

This section provides an example of an incident encoded in the IODEF. This do not necessarily represent the only way to encode a particular incident. This example reports an attack to a CSIRT and is extended from the example described in [RFC5070]. It uses identifiers whose dictionary follows CVE 1.0 schema, and it aembeds XML following CEE 0.6.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<IODEF-Document version="1.00" lang="en"
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
  xmlns:iodef="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0"
  xmlns:iodef-sci="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-sci-1.0"
  xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
  <Incident purpose="reporting">
    <IncidentID name="csirt.example.com">189493</IncidentID>
    <ReportTime>2001-09-13T23:19:24+00:00</ReportTime>
    <Description>Incident report in company xx</Description>
    <Assessment>
      <Impact completion="failed" type="admin"/>
    </Assessment>
  </Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
```

```

<Method>
  <Description>An identifier of a vulnerability is embedded</Description
>
  <AdditionalData dtype="xml">
    <iodef-sci:Vulnerability
      SpecID="http://cve.mitre.org/cve/downloads/1.0"
      VulnerabilityID="CVE-2010-0483"/>
    </AdditionalData>
</Method>
<Contact role="creator" type="organization">
  <ContactName>Example.com CSIRT</ContactName>
  <RegistryHandle registry="arin">example-com</RegistryHandle>
  <Email>contact@csirt.example.com</Email>
</Contact>
  <EventData>
<Flow>
  <System category="source">
    <Node>
      <Address category="ipv4-addr">192.0.2.200</Address>
      <Counter type="event">57</Counter>
    </Node>
  </System>
  <System category="target">
    <Node>
      <Address category="ipv4-net">192.0.2.16/28</Address>
    </Node>
    <Service ip_protocol="6">
      <Port>80</Port>
    </Service>
    <AdditionalData dtype="xml">
      <iodef-sci:Platform SpecID="http://cpe.mitre.org/dictionary/2.0"
        PlatformID="cpe://microsoft:windows:xp:pro:sp2"/>
    </AdditionalData>
  </System>
</Flow>
<Expectation action="block-host" />
<Expectation action="other"/>
<!-- <RecordItem> has an excerpt from a log -->
<Record>
  <RecordData>
    <DateTime>2001-09-13T18:11:21+02:00</DateTime>
    <Description>a Web-server event record</Description>
    <RecordItem dtype="xml">
      <iodef-sci:EventReport SpecID="http://cee.mitre.org">
        <iodef-sci:RawData dtype="xml">
          <cee:cee xmlns="http://cee.mitre.org/1.0/profile/"
            xmlns:cee="http://cee.mitre.org/1.0/">
            <cee:event>
              <host>system.example.com</host>

```

```
        <pname>auth</pname>
        <time>2011-12-20T12:38:05.123456-05:00</time>
        <appname>application</appname>
        <pid>123</pid>
        <sev>10</sev>
        <action>login</action>
        <domain>app</domain>
        <object>account</object>
        <service>web</service>
        <status>success</status>
    </cee:event>
</cee:cee>
</iodef-sci:RawData>
</iodef-sci:EventReport>
</RecordItem>
</RecordData>
</Record>
</EventData>
<History>
  <!-- Contact was previously made with the source network owner -->
  <HistoryItem action="contact-source-site">
    <DateTime>2001-09-14T08:19:01+00:00</DateTime>
    <Description>Notification sent to
      constituency-contact@192.0.2.200</Description>
  </HistoryItem>
</History>
</Incident>
</IODEF-Document>
```

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